As this war aptly demonstrates, what a military can do with 10 battalions in a limited war can’t necessarily be replicated with more than a hundred in a complex, large-scale military operation. In theory, this offered flexibility, although how it would work in practice on a large scale remained guesswork. The battalion tactical group was not a recent development, but it became a yardstick within the Russian military to measure readiness and the force’s capacity to generate units on short notice. These formations were composed of infantry, armor, artillery, and supporting assets. They were expected to have higher readiness in terms of equipment and manpower and be able to deploy on short notice. Battalion tactical groups were task organized combined arms formations with habitual training relationships, centered around a maneuver battalion within a regiment or brigade. The Russian military eventually came to adopt a force structure that could deploy as battalion tactical groups, or as the entire formation, such as a regiment or brigade. It also struggled to reconcile keeping about 250,000 conscripts in the military, with their generally poor suitability for military operations, and political restrictions on employing them in conflicts. The military sought to have a high-readiness force within the former Soviet approach of large formations requiring a degree of mobilization. Russia regressed to a partial-mobilization force, hoping to have the best of both worlds: more forces and equipment, reduced staffing and cost, plus the ability to generate substantial combat power on short notice. The staffing approach to brigades and divisions was the same. Hence, the ground forces adopted a mixed-force structure, with divisions and brigades, increasing overall force structure. The Russian military then rolled back some of these reforms starting in 2013, not only because several proved deeply unpopular, but also because the force was considered too small for a regional or large-scale war against a superior opponent. This process took place largely between 20. Along with the United States, Russia came to believe that a smaller but better equipped and trained military could handle a range of conflicts. Russia focused on making contract servicemen the majority of its armed forces. The Russian military was primarily composed of conscripts, which it drafted twice a year, and contract servicemen - considered “enlisted professionals” who volunteered for several years of service. Successive Russian military reforms since the fall of the Soviet Union sought to abandon the old conscript-heavy mobilization army by consolidating formations and equipment, converting an unwieldy Soviet inheritance into a smaller standing force. To understand why this happened to one of the largest militaries in the world, we must start with examining the major tradeoffs made in Russian force design. The Russian armed forces are now pressed to sustain operations in Ukraine and attempting what amounts to a partial mobilization to stem the prospect of significant reversals on the battlefield. Consequently, the Russian army was optimized for a short and sharp war while lacking the capacity to sustain a major conventional conflict at “peace time” manning levels. The Russian military also compromised by establishing a partial mobilization force. As it stands, the Russian military has a shortage of manpower - especially infantry. The full extent of Russia’s personnel weaknesses has become clear during this war. These decisions help explain many of the observed struggles the Russian armed forces have had in combined arms operations, fighting in urban environments, and attempts to hold terrain. Some of the most significant problems being experienced by the Russian armed forces are the result of conscious choices and tradeoffs. Force structure reveals a great deal about a military and its assumptions of what wars it plans to fight and how it plans to fight them. Plans rarely survive first contact with an opponent and militaries invariably must adapt, but strategic force structure choices can prove decisive. Less attention has been paid, however, to Russian force structure and manpower issues as a critical element now shaping outcomes in this war. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a deeply flawed military operation, from Moscow’s assumptions about an easy victory, to a lack of preparation, poor planning, and force employment.
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